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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
visions of the statute in effect at the time of his death, his widow
was entitled to benefits of $75.00 per month. The statute in effect
at the time of his last exposure to the hazards of silicosis, however,
limited her recovery to $65.00 per month. In granting the claimant
a recovery of $65.00 per month, the court determined that the
amendment increasing the benefits would not be given retroactive
operation as it affected the substantive rights of the parties to
the compensation contract; and that to the extent the holdings in
Webb and Peak were inconsistent with the decision in Maxwell
they were overruled.
Thus, while the law in West Virginia as to the presumption
against the retroactivity of workmen's compensation statutes has
been subject to some confusion, it now appears to be settled that
any statute which affects substantive rights of the parties is to be
prospective in effect unless the Legislature by clear, strong and
imperative words has expressed the intent that its provisions are
to operate retrospectively. Since no intention of retroactivity is
manifested in the "occupational pneumoconiosis" amendment, one
must conclude that, in the absence of a return to the judicial legisla-
tion of the Webb and Peak cases, only those workers subject to the
hazards of pneumoconiosis on or after July 1, 1969, are entitled to
benefits under the provisions of the current statute.
Kenneth Joseph Fordyce
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -
THE DELIBERATE INTENT STATUTE:
PROVIDING FOR THE VICTIMS OF INDUSTRY?
I.
SoME ALTERNATivEs TO COMPENSATON BENEFITS
One of the basic objectives of the Workmen's Compensation
Law is to relieve employers of the burden of tort actions for personal
injuries to their employees resulting from their employment. An
employer, who pays into the workmen's compensation fund is
not liable for damages under common law or statute for the injury
or death of his employee as the result of an employment-related
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accident." In West Virginia this basic purpose is qualified by the
provision that if the injury or death results from the deliberate in-
tention of the employer to cause such injury or death, then the
injured employee, or the dependents of a deceased employee have
cause of action against the employer in addition to the benefits
receivable under the Workmen's Compensation Act.2 Other juris-
dictions have completely excluded intentional torts by employers
from compensation coverage through a rule to the effect that the
compensation acts apply only to accidental injuries and not to
intentional injuries.3 This view is expressed in Lavin v. Goldberg
Bldg. Material Corp. as follows:
4
It would be abhorrent to our sense of justice to hold that
an employer may assault his employee and then compel
the injured workman to accept the meagre allowance pro-
vided by the Workmen's Compensation Law.
The opposite view that compensation is the exclusive remedy
for intentional torts by an employer has been criticized as "a per-
version of the purpose of the act":; and as "a travesty on the use of
the English language."6
Consequently, several jurisdictions, by statute, have provided
the employee with an election to sue at common law or a percent-
age increase in compensation as an additional benefit where the
employee's injury was caused by the employer's misconduct such as:
willful misconduct generally, failure to provide safety devices, or
willful intent to cause injury. An option to sue at common law is
1W. VA. CODE ch. 23, art. 2, § 6 (Michie 1966).
'W. VA. CODE ch. 23, art. 4, § 2 (Michie Supp. 1969).
'E.g., Le Pochat v. Pendleton, 187 Misc. 296, 63 N.Y.S.2d 313, afd, 271
App. Div. 964, 68 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1947); De Coigne v. Ludlum Steel Co., 251
App. Div. 662, 297 N.Y. Supp. 636 (1937); Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co.,
194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940).
'274 App. Div. 690, 693-94, 87 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93 (1949), appeal denied, 275
App. Div. 865, 89 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1949).
'Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 471, 231 N.W. 233, 234 (1930).
'Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 55, 9 S.E.2d 35, 37 (1940).
It would not seem unreasonable to assume that the compensation statutes were
never designed to replace causes of action for intentional torts. However, in
this regard, the Georgia supreme court, in a questionable decision, held that
no assault had been committed where the allegations were that a company
president, who unsuccessfully attempted to learn from an employee the names
of other employees who attended a union organization meeting, knowingly
forced the reluctant employee to work with his bare hands in an acid vat.
(The employee was unaware of the dangerous propensities of the acid.) South-
ern Wire 9- Iron, Inc. v. Fowler, 217 Ga. 727, 124 S.E.2d 738 (1962), reversing
104 Ga. App. 401, 122 S.E.2d 157 (1961).
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provided by statute for willful failure to conform to statutes or
orders in South Dakota,7 and New Hampshire s while percentage
increases in compensation awards result from failure to provide
safety devices or to obey safety regulations, or failure to comply
with duties imposed by statute or regulation in Kentucky,9
Missouri,' 0 New Mexico,- North Carolina, 2 Ohio, 8 Utah,1 4 and
Wisconsin.-5 In California 6 and Massachusetts 7 increased awards of
50 percent and 100 percent respectively are assessed as penalties
where the employer, or his supervisory personnel, are guilty of will-
ful and serious misconduct. Also, an option to sue at common law
for intentional injury by the employer is given in Kentucky,' 8 Mary-
land,' 9 Oregon, 20 Washington,21 and West Virginia,22 whereas
Texas2 3 requires a willful act or gross negligence causing death.
Since the enactment of such statutes, the courts have been
confronted with serious and perplexing questions concerning the
meaning of such terms as: "willingful," "willful and serious mis-
conduct," "intentional injury," "and deliberate intention." The
decisions in many cases have turned on the particular import or
definition that the court decided to attach to these ambiguous terms.
The problem is magnified by the fact that most courts avoid at-
tempting to explain what these terms mean by merely deciding
whether a particular set of facts constitutes the statutory description
necessary for maintaining the action. In a recent Arizona
case,2 4  for example, decedent's employer had been warn-
ed repeatedly that the ditch in which decedent was working
was unsafe. Subsequently, the ditch collapsed, killing decedent.
'S.D. CoaPILz LAws ANN. TITLz 62, ch. 3, § 13 (1967).
'N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281.10 (1966).
'Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.165 (1963).
"Mo. STAT. ANN. § 287.120 (1965).
"N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 59, art. 10, § § 7, 36 (1953).
-N.C. GEN. STAT. ch 97, § 11 (1965).
30HIO CONsr. art. II, § 35.
"UTAH CODE ANN. TITLE 35, ci. 1, § 12 (1966).
"Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.57 (1957).
"CAL. LABOR CODE § 455 (Deering 1960).
"7MAss. LAws ANN. ch. 152, § 28 (Michie 1965).
"KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.015 (1963).
"MD. COmE ANN. art. 101, § 44 (1957).
"ORE, REV. STAT. § 656.156 (1967).
"WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (1962).
-W. VA. CODE ch. 23, art. 4, § 2 (Michie Supp. 1969).
zTx. CIVIL STAT. art. 8306, § 5 (1967).
2"Serna v. Statewide Contractors, Inc., 429 P.2d 504 (Ariz. App. 1967).
But see, Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co., 114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757(1988).
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Nevertheless, the court held that the employer's failure to act under
these circumstances, at least, did not constitute "willful misconduct"
so as to permit an action for negligence. Even where an employer
failed to rectify a condition which had injured the employee twice
before, the Oregon court has held that there was no "deliberate
intent" to produce the injury.25
Generally, tort actions alleging injuries caused by the employ-
er's willful misconduct have met with little success either because
all such injuries were held to be compensable under the compen-
sation statute3 or because there was no proof of a specific intent to
injure the employee. 7 Thus, where the plaintiff alleged that his
employer intentionally and unlawfully removed safety devices from
machines operated by plaintiff for the purpose of increasing profits
and production, such allegations were held insufficient to remove
plaintiff's injuries from the compensation act because there wis
no allegation that the employer had acted with a deliberate intent
to injure the plaintiff. 8 Some courts have also refused to entertain"
the tort action under those compensation acts which permit em-
ployees to collect compensation and bring a tort action if they can
prove that their injuries resulted from the deliberate intent of their
employer to injure or kill, where there was no specific proof that
the employer intended to injure the particular plaintiff.9
II.
THE DELIBERATE INTENT DILEMMA IN WEST VIRGINIA
An historical review of the West Virginia cases dealing with the
so-called "delibertate intent" statute provides a picture of uncer-
'Caline v. Meade, 239 Ore. 239, 396 P.2d 694 (1964).
"0E.g., Pearson v. Rogers Galvanizing Co., 115 Ind. App. 426, 59 N.E.2d
364 (1945); Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946);
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Reyes, 76 Nev. 212, 337 P.2d 624 (1959); Roberts
v. Barklay, 369 P.2d 808 (Okla. 1962).
E.g., Wilkinson v. Achber, 101 N.H. 7, 131 A.2d 51 (1957); Breimhorst
v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949); Cummings v. McCoy,
192 S.C. 469, 7 S.E.2d 222 (1940).
2Santiago v. Brill Monfort Co., 10 N.Y.2d 718, 176 N.E.2d 835, 219
N.Y.S.2d 266 (1961).
'See e.g., Fryman v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 277 S.W.2d 25 (Ky.
1955); Jenkins v. Carman Mfg. Co., 79 Ore. 448, 155 Pac. 703 (1916); Biggs
v. Donovan-Corkery Logging Co., 185 Wash. 284, 54 P.2d 235 (1936); Delthony
v. Standard Furniture Co., 119 Wash. 293, 205 Pac. 379 (1922); Allen v.
Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 186 S.E. 612 (1936). But see
Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co., 114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933), and
Weis v. Allen, 147 Ore. 670, 35 P.2d 478 (1934).
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tainty and confusion which suggests a need for statutory modifica-
tion. The West Virginia statute provides in part:30
If injury or death result to an employee from the deliberate
intention of his employer to produce such injury or death,
the employee, the widow, widower, child or dependent of
the employee shall have the privilege to take under this
chapter, and shall also have cause of action against the
employer, as if this chapter had not been enacted, for any
excess of damages over the amount received or receivable
under this chapter.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has found this
to be a troublesome statute.
In a 1933 case, Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co.,31 the plaintiff
alleged that the employer willfully and deliberately allowed plain-
tiff's decedent to work under an overhanging bank, which the em-
player well knew was about to collapse; and that plaintiff's decedent
was thereby killed by being buried alive. The court indicated that the
difficulty in bringing actions under this statute lies in defining
"deliberate intention." Some definitions, the court said:
3 2
[R] ange from the statement that a man is presumed to in-
tend the ordinary and usual consequences of his acts, to
definitions which make intent practically depend upon the
existence of actual malice. In its nature, it is bound to be
the existence of a state of mind, and since that state of
mind must be arrived at in proof by the establishment of
facts extraneous to the mind itself, it seems to us that
it is always bound to be a deduction or conclusion from
the facts so established.
The court did not state that a deliberate intent to injure could
be inferred from the facts alleged but held that these allegations
were sufficient to admit evidence, in addition to the facts alleged,
to show such intent.
The Collins decision raised at least two important questions -
(1) did the court recognize that an employee may be injured or
killed through omissions which may constitute deliberate intent
1W. VA. CODE ch. 23, art. 4, § 2 (Michie Supp. 1969).
m114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (193).
'Id. at 235, 171 S.E. at 759.
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and not mere negligence only; and (2) in order to state a good
cause of action under this statute, is it only necessary that one
allege facts extraneous to the mind, from which a conclusion or
deduction of the existence of deliberate intent may be drawn?
Perhaps as a result of the court's failure to answer these ques-
tions adequately, one year later it was faced again with the problem
of applying this statute to a bizarre set of facts. In Maynard v. Is-
land Creek Coal Co.a3 the plaintiff alleged that a conveyer of a con-
tinuous chain of buckets had come into a state of disrepair which an
employee of the defendant attempted to ameliorate by inserting a
bolt that protruded above the surface covering of the conveyer at a
place where the covering was broken and the moving buckets ex-
posed. As a result, plaintiff's decedent stumbled over the extended
bolt, fell into the open conveyor, and was killed. Plaintiff further
alleged that the covering was frequently out of repair and that the
danger of its breaking and momentarily coming open was so ap-
parent that defendant had notice that plaintiff's decedent was
required to work in a veritable death trap. To the plaintiff the
events allegedly constituted "willful, deliberate, and unlawful
negligence" done with deliberate intent to injure or kill plaintiff's
decedent. However, in ruling on these allegations the court said:'
Gross negligence is not tantamount to "deliberate inten-
tion" to inflict injury. It may be that the carelessness indif-
ference and negligence of an employer may be so wanton as
to warrant a judicial determination that his ulterior intent
was to inflict injury. But in the very nature of things, a
showing which would warrant such finding would have to
be clear and forceful in high degree.
Thus the court, rather than dispelling the uncertainty left by
Collins, clouded the issue considerably more by the indefiniteness of
the terms "clear," "forceful," and "high degree."
In Maynard the court recognized the allegations in Collins as
"incriminatory" and "revolting" but refused to go further.35 The
uncertainty following Collins was thus increased in Maynard be-
cause in the latter the court denied the sufficiency of the allegations
upon the rationalization that Collins presented a far more ag-
-115 W. Va. 249, 175 S.E. 70 (1934).
37d. at 253, 175 S.E. at 72 (emphasis added).
'Maynard v. Island Greek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249, 175 S.E. 70 (1934).
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gravated situation and seldom can such facts as alleged in Collins
be pleaded.
Perhaps realizing that the questions raised under the deliber-
ate intent statute had not been adequately answered in either
Collins or Maynard, the court in Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining
Co. 6 began to look elsewhere for help. The court in Allen did not
even attempt to apply the clouded principles previously established
in Collins and Maynard, but rather discussed the history of West Vir-
ginia's compensation statute and compared the decisions of other
jurisdictions with similar statutes. The court's approach in Allen
seemed to be as if West Virginia had no prior case law in this
area. The court merely stated the ruling in Collins and Maynard
and then, without stating a reason, held the allegations in question
insufficient to allow the plaintiff the additional cause of action.
It seems ironic that what may have been the weakest set of
facts from the plainiff's standpoint has prompted the court
to make, perhaps, its strongest statement favorable to a plaintiff,
on the deliberate intent statute. In Brewer v. Appalachian Const.
Inc. the court said in syllabus 3:37
In an action by an employee against an employer, who is a
subscriber to the Workmen's Compensation Fund and not
in default, for an injury committed with deliberate intent,
the allegations of the declaration must allege facts showing,
or clearly implying, such intent; negligence, however
wanton does not supply such intent.
After reviewing the previous cases in West Virginia dealing
with this issue, the court recognized that the charge of deliberate
intention is necessarily only a deduction from the allegations of
knowledge of the dangers involved. Nevertheless, relying upon the
"'117 W. Va. 631, 186 S.E. 612 (1936). The plaintiff was injured while
riding on the front end of a trip of empty mine cars when he struck a wooden
trap door which hung across the track. Prior to the day of this accident a
piece of canvass was used in place of this wooden trap door. Plaintiff denied
that he had knowledge of the installation of the wooden door.
'135 W. Va. 739, 65 S.E2d 87 (1951) (emphasis added). The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant stored a large quantity of powder and explosives,
fifteen hundred dynamite caps, three hundred sticks of dynamite, and a
large quantity of gasoline in or near mine buildings where plaintiff worked.
The declaration alleged that these acts were done with a deliberate intent
to injure or kill the plaintiff and further that these acts were in violation
and disregard of a state statute prohibiting the storage of such explosives
in or near mine buildings.
[Vol. 72
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previous cases, the court followed the narrow view that the careless-
ness, negligence, and recklessness of the defendant in failing to ob-
viate these dangers are not sufficient to show a deliberate intention
to injure or kill.
Ill.
CONCLUSION
Normally, the perpetrator of an intentional tort is liable for
exemplary or punitive damages. 8 However, if an employer who
commits an intentional tort need only pay workmen's compensa-
tion benefits, he not only enjoys a substantial windfall, but also es-
capes a deterrent against similar future behavior. An employer who
knows that if certain changes are effected or certain conditions are
continued, an unreasonable risk of harm to his employees will exist,
may not be far removed, in terms of culpability, from an employer
who intentionally abuses his employees. Therefore, if the courts
were to take a more solicitous attitude toward such employees, this
should serve as a deterrent to continued reckless, indifferent in-
dustrial practices.
It has been suggested that the employee be given a tort
remedy at law, in addition to compensation benefits, where the
employee is injured as a result of his employer's negligence.39 Sever-
al arguments are offered in support of this proposal. First, an
employer who negligently injures another's property is liable for
the full amount of the loss, and therefore his liability should not be
less for negligently injuring a human being. Since workmen's com-
pensation is primarily a wage loss insurance system, it looks upon
the employee as an instrument of production and not as a
human being. It seems unreasonable that a system which excludes
his value as a human being should be his exclusive remedy.40 Second,
when personal injuries with such tragic severity as pain and
suffering, permanent disfigurement, impotence or sterility would be
fully compensable to a non-employee victim, an employee suffering
sich injuries should not go uncompensated merely because a loss of
a different nature is insured by his employer. 41 Third, with the
downfall of such doctrines as charitable and governmental immun-
nSee McCoRnIcK, DAMAGES § 81 (1935).





West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 12
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol72/iss1/12
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ity,42 full restoration for negligently inflicted injuries seems to be
the general rule. Therefore, since the rationale behind workmen's
compensation from the employer's standpoint is to prevent tort
actions by injured employees, perhaps this is no longer a sufficient
reason for the law to discriminate against a negligently injured per-
son merely because the tortfeasor is his employer.43 Fourth, the fact
that avoidable injuries could cost more than unavoidable injuries
should create an effective economic motivation for accident pre-
vention and safety.
4"
As long as compensation benefits remain inadequate along
with continued gaps in coverage, employees will continue to assert
tort actions againsts their employers wherever possible. The funda-
mental premise that all work injuries should be compensated under
workmen's compensation is being challenged by attacks on the
exclusivity provisions in the compensation acts. These attacks
reflect dissatisfaction with the present status of workmen's compen-
sation and suggest that reform may be desirable.
Larry Andrew Winter
"See e.g., Muskof v. Corning Hasp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11
cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (governmental immunity); Mullikin v. Jewish Hosp.
Ass'n, 348 S.W.2d 930 (Kv. 1961) (charitable immunity); Adkins v. St. Francis
Hasp., 149 W. Va. 705, 143 S.E.2d 154 (1965) (charitable immunity).
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